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Case C-205/06, Commission v. Austria, judgment of the Court (Grand 
Chamber) of 3 March 2009, not yet reported; Case C-249/06, Commission v. 
Sweden, judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 3 March 2009, not yet 
reported.
1. Introduction 
The coexistence of the Member States as fully sovereign subjects of interna-
tional law with the European Community has been an area of endless fascina-
tion for international and European Union lawyers alike. This has been spurred 
on by a number of judgments rendered by the European Court of Justice in the 
last four years: these range from the constraints imposed on Member States 
once the Commission has been authorized to negotiate international agree-
ments,1 to the limited choice they have in the context of international conven-
tions in which they participate along with the EC (Mox Plant),2 to the duties 
imposed on them in the context of international organizations to which the EC 
is not a signatory even though their scope falls within its competence (IMO).3
 Another area where serious issues have been raised concerns the interna-
tional obligations assumed by Member States prior to their accession to the 
EU. An interesting twist is provided by two Grand Chamber judgments against 
Sweden and Austria. Rendered in the context of enforcement actions pursuant 
to Article 226 EC, these are about bilateral investment treaties (BITs) con-
cluded by these States with a host of third countries. Similar actions were 
brought against Denmark and Finland: the former case was closed following 
the notiﬁcation by Denmark of a declaration to terminate the relevant agree-
ments, whereas, in the latter, Advocate General Sharpston rendered her Opin-
ion on 10 September 2009.4
2. The legal background – Article 307 EC 
The status and implications of pre-existing treaties concluded by Member 
States are addressed by Article 307 EC. Its ﬁrst subparagraph articulates the 
1. Case C-266/03, Commission v. Luxembourg, [2005] ECR I-4805 and Case C-433/03, 
Commission v. Germany, [2005] ECR I-6985.
2. Case C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland, [2006] ECR I-4635.
3. Case C-47/07, Commission v. Greece, judgment of 12 Feb. 2009, nyr.
4. Case C-118/07, Commission v. Finland, Opinion of  A.G. Sharpston of 10 Sept. 2009.  
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principle pacta sunt servanda by acknowledging that Community law may not 
affect the international obligations assumed by Member States prior to their 
accession to the Union: “The rights and obligations arising from agreements 
concluded before 1 January 1958 or, for acceding States, before the date of 
their accession, between one or more Member States on the one hand, and one 
or more third countries on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of 
this Treaty.”
 However, the second subparagraph adds a Community law layer:5
“To the extent that such agreements are not compatible with this Treaty, 
the Member State or States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to 
eliminate the incompatibilities established. Member States shall, where 
necessary, assist each other to this end and shall, where appropriate, adopt 
a common attitude.”
This latter obligation is a clear illustration of what the duty of cooperation, laid 
down in Article 10 EC, entails in this area of external relations. Indeed, even if 
Article 307 did not exist, its ratio would be read into the duty of cooperation 
by the Community’s judges.6  
 The scope of Article 307 EC is unlimited: any agreement concluded by a 
Member State prior to its accession to the Union falls within it.7 However, it 
applies only to the obligations assumed by Member States – it does not protect 
rights conferred upon them by the agreement in question.8 
 All in all, Article 307 EC seeks to strike a balance between respecting the 
rights of third countries conferred by a pre-accession agreement, and remedy-
ing the incompatibility with EC law which this agreement may raise. What is 
striking is that the EC Treaty is silent on quite how is this to be achieved: there 
is no reference to the period of time within which the incompatibilities are to 
be addressed; neither is there reference to the options available to Member 
States to do so, or their order of preference, depending on their intensity or 
how onerous it would be for the Member States to avail themselves of them. 
5. The third subpara of this provision reads as follows: “In applying the agreements referred 
to in the ﬁrst paragraph, Member States shall take into account the fact that the advantages 
accorded under this Treaty by each Member State form an integral part of the establishment of 
the Community and are thereby inseparably linked with the creation of common institutions, the 
conferring of powers upon them and the granting of the same advantage by all the other Mem-
ber States”.   
6. For an analysis of Art. 307 and its application in practice, see Klabbers, Treaty Conﬂict 
and the European Union (CUP, 2009), Ch. 6, and Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law 
(Hart Publishing, 2006), Ch. 8. 
7. Case 812/79, Attorney General v. Juan C Burgoa, [1980] ECR 2787, para 6. 
8. Case C-158/91, Ministère public and Direction du travail and de l’emploi v. Levy, [1993] 
ECR I-4287, at para 12. 
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In certain cases, speciﬁc issues are dealt with in secondary legislation.9 How-
ever, it has been largely left to the Court of Justice to elaborate on the speciﬁc 
implications of Article 307 EC. It has done so over the years by stressing the 
effectiveness of both the compliance by Member States with their prior inter-
national obligations and the effort to address any ensuing incompatibilities. On 
the one hand, the Community institutions must not impede the Member States 
in the performance of their treaty obligations.10 On the other hand, if a Mem-
ber State, in its effort to address an incompatibility with EC law by renegotiat-
ing a prior agreement, comes across difﬁculties which render such renegotiation 
impossible, Community law imposes a speciﬁc duty: the Member State must 
denounce the agreement.11
 This obligation has been construed consistently with the Court’s approach 
to defences put forward in the context of enforcement proceedings: in other 
words, political and practical problems rendering compliance with EC law dif-
ﬁcult are not taken into account. In this vein, war and constant tension in 
Angola and disintegration in former Yugoslavia may not absolve a Member 
State from its duty to remedy the incompatibilities between a pre-accession 
agreement and EC law: if renegotiation is impossible, denunciation must be 
considered.12 
3. The factual and legal context of the BITs judgments
The EC Treaty provisions on the free movement of capital expressly cover 
relations with third countries. Article 56(1) EC required that all restrictions on 
the movement of capital between Member States and third countries be pro-
hibited, a prohibition extended to all restrictions on payments under Article 
56(2) EC. 
 Prior to their accession to the European Union, Austria and Sweden had 
concluded bilateral investment treaties (hereafter BITs) with a number of third 
countries.13 These agreements safeguarded the principle of free movement, as 
9. In the area of maritime transport, for instance, Regulation 4055/86 sets a deadline for 
 certain agreements, O.J. 1986, L 378/1.
10. Attorney General v. Juan C. Burgoa, cited supra note 7, para 9.  
11. Case C-170/98, Commission v. Belgium (re: maritime transport agreement with Zaire), 
[1999] ECR I-5493, paras. 49 et seq., Joined Cases C-171/98, C-201/98 & C-202/98, Commis-
sion v. Belgium and Luxembourg (re: maritime transport agreements between the Belgo-Luxem-
bourg Economic Union with Togo, Mali, Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire), [1999] ECR I-5517.
12. Case C-84/98, Commission v. Portugal, [2000] ECR I-5215, Case C-62/98, Commission 
v. Portugal, [2000] ECR I-5171.
13. Austria had concluded with China, Malaysia, Russia (originally with the Soviet Union), 
Korea, Turkey, and Cape Verde. Sweden had concluded with Vietnam, Argentina, the Ivory 
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set out in Article 56 EC. They also contain a “transfer clause”: this guarantees 
to the investors of the each party the free transfer, without undue delay and in 
freely convertible currency, of payments connected with an investment.  
 The Commission took the view that, whilst facilitating the free movement 
of capital to and from third countries, these provisions undermined the ability 
of the Community to impose restrictions on such movement. Under the EC 
Treaty, such restrictions may be imposed in three sets of circumstances. First, 
in accordance with Article 57(2) EC, the Council may adopt measures on the 
movement of capital to or from third countries involving direct investment, 
including investment in real estate, establishment, the provision of ﬁnancial 
services or the admission of securities to capital markets; such measures would 
be adopted by qualiﬁed majority on a Commission proposal, except where the 
relevant measures would constitute a step back in Community law as regards 
the liberalization of the movement of capital to or from third countries, in 
which case unanimity would be required.14
 Second, in accordance with Article 59 EC, the Council may adopt safeguard 
measures with regard to third countries for a period up to six months if such 
measures are strictly necessary where, in exceptional circumstances, move-
ments of capital to or from third countries cause, or threaten to cause, serious 
difﬁculties for the operation of economic and monetary union; such measures 
are adopted by qualiﬁed majority on a Commission proposal.
 Third, in accordance with Article 60(1) EC, the Council may take the nec-
essary urgent measures following a common position or a joint action adopted 
by the Council pursuant to Title V TEU on the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy which provides that the Community interrupts or reduces, in part or 
completely, the movement of capital and payments as regards third countries; 
such measures are adopted by qualiﬁed majority in accordance with Article 
301 EC, to which Article 60(1) EC refers expressly.
 The Commission argued that the maintenance of the relevant BITs violated 
secondary legislation envisaged under Articles 57(2), 59 and 60(1) EC, the 
above provisions themselves as well as the duty of cooperation laid down in 
Article 10 EC. In particular, it argued that the absence of any reference to the 
right of Austria and Sweden to impose restrictions adopted by the Council 
under the above provisions was liable to make it more difﬁcult, or even impos-
sible, for them to comply with their Community law duty to implement such 
restrictions. Whilst the renegotiation or denunciation of BITs were possible 
Coast, Hong Kong, Indonesia, China, Malaysia, Madagascar, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, 
Serbia and Montenegro (originally with Yugoslavia), Yemen.
14. Such measures would be adopted “whilst endeavouring to achieve the objective of free 
movement of capital between Member States and third countries to the greatest extent possible 
and without prejudice to the other Chapters of this Treaty”. 
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and would enable the two Member States to comply with their EC law obliga-
tion, they would need to be carried out in accordance with the periods of time 
required under public international law. During such periods, the free move-
ment provisions of the Agreements would be enforced and the Community 
rules restricting such movement would be applied in a disuniform manner 
within the Community.
4. The Opinion by Advocate General Maduro 
In his Opinion, Advocate General Maduro pointed out that no violation of EC 
law could be established under either secondary legislation envisaged in 
Articles 57(2), 59, and 60(1) EC, or these provisions themselves. In relation to 
the former, the absence of legislation creates no obligation on States and, 
therefore, entails no incompatibility under Article 307 EC; in relation to the 
latter, “to impose an obligation on Member States to refrain from legislating, 
whether by national measures or international instruments, to prevent any 
potential conﬂict with future Community legislation would turn the free 
 movement of capital to and from third countries into an area of exclusive 
com petence”.15 
 This emphasis on competence and its shared nature informs Advocate Gen-
eral Maduro’s analysis, which focuses on the duty of loyal cooperation. He 
argues that “Member States are not permitted to jeopardize a Community 
objective, even a potential one. It is irrelevant that the pursuit of this objective 
requires certain actions in concreto (here, the actual exercise of the compe-
tence); the obligation to respect the objective exists and is binding on Member 
States”.16 In doing so, he draws the parallel with directives: as the Member 
States are prevented from seriously compromising the result prescribed by a 
directive,17 they should also be prevented from frustrating Community action. 
 However, Advocate General Maduro points out that “it is not the possibility 
of any future conﬂict with the Community legislation and its objectives”18 
which raises the problem; instead, “the problem only arises where the national 
measures or the international obligations of Member States are liable to jeop-
ardize the effectiveness of possible future Community legislation and, in doing 
so, de facto restrict the freedom which the Treaty confers on the Community to 
15. Para 28 of his Joined Opinion where he then observed that, “[i]n fact, any area of such 
competence would be liable to suffer the same fate”.
16. Ibid., para 39.
17. Case C-129/96, Inter-Environment Wallonie, [1997] ECR I-7411, para 45. 
18. Para 40. 
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act in those areas”.19 It is in order to preserve the effectiveness of EC action 
under Articles 57(2), 59 and 60(1) EC that he suggests that the Inter-Environ-
ment Wallonie ruling on directives be applied in the context of Article 307 EC 
in order to ascertain whether agreements by Member States are liable seriously 
to compromise such action. Advocate General Maduro answers the question in 
the afﬁrmative. Whilst the impact which compliance with their duties under 
BITs may have on EC action restricting free movement may vary, he argues 
that “the fact remains that the agreements concluded by Austria and Sweden 
may prevent the immediate application of restrictions, and such application 
may be essential to the objectives of Community legislation”.20 
 The Advocate General goes on to examine the defences on the basis of 
which the Austrian and Swedish Governments argued that the incompatibility 
with Article 307 EC would be avoided, either pursuant to an EC law-compati-
ble interpretation of the agreements by the national authorities, or public inter-
national law principles such as rebus sic stantibus. All these were dismissed 
“as a matter of principle” because “[o]nce an agreement is liable, because of 
its wording, to impair the application of the Treaty, Article 307 EC already pro-
vides an adequate remedy: Member States must take all appropriate steps to 
eliminate the incompatibility, which has been interpreted by the Court as 
amending or, if necessary, denouncing the agreement”.21 Advocate General 
Maduro, then, concluded that the arguments of the Member States would ren-
der this proviso of Article 307 EC meaningless. These defences, along with the 
Austrian argument that it was working on a “regional economic integration 
organisation” (REIO) clause, will be examined in detail below. 
5. The judgments
In its rulings, the Court of Justice followed a different line of reasoning than 
that put forward by its Advocate General. Whilst it noted that the BITs in ques-
tion were consistent with the wording of Article 56(1) EC, it then focused on 
the restrictive measures which the Council may adopt pursuant to Articles 
57(2), 59 and 60(1) EC.  It pointed out that, “[i]n order to ensure the effective-
ness of those provisions, measures restricting the free movement of capital 
must be capable … of being applied immediately with regard to the States to 
which they relate, which may include some of the States which have signed 
one of the agreements at issue” with Austria and Sweden.22 It held that the BITs 
19. Ibid.
20. Para 53.  
21. Para 56. 
22. Para 37 in Case C-249/06, and para 36 in C-205/06. 
Case C-205/06, Case C-249/06 2065
in question would run counter to that objective insofar as, on the one hand, 
they contain no provision enabling the Member State concerned to exercise its 
rights and to fulﬁl its obligations as a member of the Community, and, on the 
other hand, there is no international law mechanism which makes that pos-
sible. As the former was common ground, the Court focused on the latter. 
It pointed out that neither a renegotiation of the agreement, nor suspension 
or denunciation would guarantee the effectiveness of Community’s action 
restricting the movement of capital to or from a third country: in relation to the 
former, “the period of time necessarily involved in any international negotia-
tions which would be required in order to reopen discussion of the agreements 
at issue is inherently incompatible with the practical effectiveness of those 
measures”;23 in relation to the latter, “the possibility of relying on other mecha-
nisms offered by international law … is too uncertain in its effects to guarantee 
that the measures adopted by the Council could be applied effectively”.24 
 An issue which arose in the context of the action against Austria was the lat-
ter’s intention to introduce a “regional economic integration organisation” 
(REIO) clause. Introduced in future agreements, this clause would reserve cer-
tain rights to the Community and enable Austria to apply any measures restrict-
ing movement of capital and payments which may be adopted by the Council 
under Articles 57(2), 59 and 60(1) EC. The Court accepted that such a clause 
“should, in principle,…be  considered capable of removing the established 
incompatibility”.25 However, following Advocate General Maduro’s advice, it 
pointed out that Austria had taken no steps during the two-month period pre-
scribed in the Commission’s reasoned opinion in order to eliminate the risk of 
conﬂict with the restrictive measures which the Council may adopt under Arti-
cles 57(2) EC, 59 EC and 60(1) EC.  
 Finally, the Court pointed out in both judgments that the incompatibilities 
with EC law raised by BITs are not limited to Austria and Sweden and con-
cluded as follows: 
“in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 307 EC, where neces-
sary, the Member States must assist each other with a view to eliminating 
the incompatibilities established and must adopt, where appropriate, a 
common attitude. In the context of its duty under Article 211 EC, to ensure 
that the provisions of the Treaty are applied, it is for the Commission to 
take any steps which may facilitate mutual assistance between the Member 
States concerned and their adoption of a common attitude”.26  
23. Para 40 in Case C-249/06 and para 39 in C-205/06.
24. Para 41 in Case C-249/06 and para 40 in C-205/06. 
25. Para 42 in Case C-205/06. 
26. Para 44 in Case C-205/06 and Case C-249/06. 
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6. Comment 
6.1. The applicability of Article 307 EC rather than Article 10 EC
In its rulings, the Court of Justice does not follow the advice of Advocate 
General Maduro to rely upon the duty of loyal cooperation  laid down in Article 
10 EC rather than Article 307 EC. In the Opinion, the Advocate General 
referred to the “empowerment” of the Community to act under Articles 57(2) 
EC, 59 EC and 60(1) EC and argued that empowerment would only impose a 
Community law obligation on Member States where the Community has 
exclusive competence.27 To the Commission’s argument about the speciﬁc 
content of the above EC Treaty provisions, he responded that this was not “a 
reason to depart from the principles of shared competence and preclude 
Member States from legislating in the absence of Community action” and 
pointed out that “an answer to the question whether Member States have obli-
gations is not dependent on the scope of the competence, but should be appli-
cable to all areas of shared competence”.28  
 There are two main problems with this line of reasoning. First, it should be 
recalled that the duty of loyal cooperation as laid down in Article 10 EC is not 
distinct from the duty imposed on Member States under Article 307 EC. In 
fact, the ratio of the second and third subparagraphs of the latter provision pro-
vides speciﬁc illustrations of the general duty laid down in Article 10 EC.29 
And this underlies the Court’s interpretation of Article 307 EC (a point which 
will be analysed below). It is not immediately apparent why the general obli-
gation should be relied upon when a speciﬁc obligation is relevant. 
 Second, the above line of reasoning appears to make assumptions which are 
supported by neither the wording nor the context of the EC Treaty. In dis-
missing the relevance of Article 307 EC, Advocate General Maduro links its 
applicability to the nature of the Community’s competence under Articles 
57(2) EC, 59 EC and 60(1) EC: he argues that “there is only one instance 
where empowerment leads to an obligation: where the Community has exclu-
sive competence”.30 However, this does not necessarily follow. There is noth-
ing in the Treaty which prevents the deﬁnition of the duty of cooperation, as 
laid down in the second subparagraph of Article 307 EC, from taking into 
27. Paras. 26 and 28 of the Opinion. 
28. Para 30 of the Opinion.  
29. See A.G. Tizzano in Case C-216/01, Budejovicku Budvar v. Rudolf Ammersin GmbH, 
[2003] ECR I-13617, para 150. Also,  Cremona, “The Impact of Enlargement: External Policy 
and External Relations” in Cremona (Ed.), The Enlargement of the European Union (Hart Pub-
lishing, 2003), p. 161, at p. 170 and Koutrakos, op. cit. supra note 6, p. 304.   
30. Para 28 of his Opinion. 
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account the speciﬁc nature and context within which an incompatibility with 
EC law may arise. Such an interpretation would read into Article 307 EC a 
condition which the latter does not set out. In any case, the focus on the nature 
of the competence is not helpful. The problem in the cases under review is not 
that the Member States had exercised a power which ought to have been 
reserved to the Community. What was in dispute was not whether it was the 
Member States or the Community which ought to exercise the power in ques-
tion, but whether the former’s conduct prior to their accession would under-
mine the effectiveness of the exceptional measures which the latter may be 
called upon to take. The starting point for the analysis of whether there is 
an incompatibility between the national conduct and Community rules is to 
 ascertain the nature of the latter and the implications of the actions which 
the Community institutions may be called upon to take thereunder. In the 
case of Articles 59 and 60(1) EC, for instance, both the safeguard measures 
and the sanctions imposed following a CFSP measure are exceptional provi-
sions which tolerate deviations from the principle of free movement in order 
to protect interests which are deemed to be undermined by free movement. 
This exceptional nature should inform the obligation which Community law 
imposes on Member States. 
6.2. The “practical effectiveness” of Community law: A strict reading
In its rulings, the Court of Justice did not focus either on the issue of compe-
tence or the duty of cooperation. Instead, it was the effectiveness of the mea-
sures which the Council may be called upon to adopt in order to restrict the 
movement of capital or payments to or from third countries which sealed the 
fate of the BITs at issue. Exceptional measures adopted in this area have some-
thing in common: the speed with which they are to be applied determines their 
effectiveness. Even a minor delay would render them devoid of substantial 
impact and would, therefore, defeat the purpose of their adoption by the 
Council. This point is also made by the Advocate General, who points out the 
“urgent and immediately enforceable character of sanctions adopted under 
Article 60(1) EC” as well as the limited temporal scope of the restrictions 
envisaged under Article 59 EC.31
  Indeed, all the possibilities available for adjusting the free movement provi-
sions of a BIT to the new environment deﬁned by Community law restrictions 
require time in order to come to fruition. For instance, the provisions of an 
31. Para 52 of his Opinion. He also points out that, in the case of future regulation of free 
movement of capital under Art. 57(2) EC and a reduction in economic relations under Art. 60(1) 
EC for reasons other than sanctions, “the loss of effectiveness is less clear” (para 53).  
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international agreement may not be suspended or denounced instantly; instead, 
they may take place in accordance with the provisions of the agreement in 
question or the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.32 And yet, the time 
factor was only mentioned in relation to the possibility of renegotiating the 
BITs in question; in relation to their suspension or denunciation, the Court 
referred to the uncertain effects of the latter, to which it objected for their fail-
ure to guarantee that the measures adopted by the Council could be applied 
effectively. It is curious that the Court should have chosen the above formula-
tion, as it is the period of time required under public international law which 
would undermine the effectiveness of the potential restrictive measures by the 
Council.
 There is merit in this argument. All measures envisaged under Articles 57(2) 
EC, 59 EC and 60(1) EC are exceptional, insofar as they restrict the movement 
of capital or payments to or from a third country. Therefore, their effective 
application is paramount to enabling the Community to revert to a legal frame-
work which would enhance the principle of free movement laid down in Arti-
cle 56 EC. However, a qualiﬁcation is also worth mentioning in relation to 
measures envisaged under Article 57(2) EC: the urgency of their application is 
less immediately apparent than that regarding measures adopted under Articles 
59 EC and 60(1) EC. In this respect, Advocate General Maduro is correct in his 
scepticism about this particular provision in relation to which he states that 
“the loss of effectiveness is less clear”, although he concludes that “the fact 
remains that the agreements concluded by Austria and Sweden may prevent 
the immediate application of restrictions, and such application may be essen-
tial to the objectives of Community legislation”.33 
 The above qualiﬁcation is necessary because it is tied in with the need to cir-
cumscribe the application of the effectiveness rationale of the judgment. To 
apply the logic of effet utile to any measure which the Community may choose 
to apply at any time in the future in order to impose a requirement on Member 
States to renegotiate or denounce their prior treaties produces effects too oner-
ous and drastic on the basis of a criterion too uncertain and indeterminate. 
Such an interpretation of Article 307 EC would be difﬁcult to sustain.
  Indeed, neither the tenor nor the wording of the two BITs judgments appear 
to support such a broad reading of Article 307 EC. Not only are they conﬁned 
to the exceptional measures envisaged under Articles 57(2) EC, 59 EC and 
60(1) EC and the vital signiﬁcance of their immediate application, but they 
also do not follow the parallel which Advocate General Maduro drew with 
directives. It is recalled that he argued that, as Member States are under a duty 
32. See Art. 42 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
33. Para 53 of his Opinion. 
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to refrain from taking any measures liable seriously to compromise the result 
prescribed by them, so they should be “obliged to refrain from any measures 
liable seriously to compromise the exercise of Community competence” and, 
“in particular, [they should be] obliged to take all appropriate steps to prevent 
their pre-existing international obligations from jeopardising the exercise of 
Community competence”. 
 How helpful is this parallel? Advocate General Maduro introduces it in the 
context of the competence-based approach of his analysis: as Member States 
share competence with the Community in the area of movement of capital to 
and from third countries, he points out that the “implementation of directives 
is similar to shared competence in that a conﬂict with national legislation can 
occur only after a certain point in time, respectively the end of the period of 
implementation and the exercise of Community competence. The difference is 
that the implementation period is certain to end, while Community compe-
tence may never be exercised”.34 However, viewed from this perspective of 
competence and the duty of cooperation, such a parallel is of questionable use. 
A directive imposes an obligation of result on a Member State called upon to 
achieve the objectives it sets out within a time limit. The very adoption of a 
directive initiates a process within which the Member States are endowed with 
a central role and are given a wide range of options, provided that they comply 
with their duties under Article 249 EC. The ensuing challenges for Member 
States are qualitatively different from those which they face in the external 
relations sphere where their actions have repercussions on the internal plane. 
By making the parallel with the directives in this context, Advocate General 
Maduro ends up interpreting the ensuing duty on Member States in terms 
which are inherently unclear and unnecessarily broad.
 Instead, the approach adopted by the Court of Justice focuses on the speciﬁc 
nature of the measures envisaged under the EC Treaty provisions which the 
“transfer clause” of the BITs was alleged to have violated. The rulings under 
review do not suggest that the possibility of a conﬂict with a potential Commu-
nity measure would render a treaty concluded by a Member State incompati-
ble with EC law; neither do they suggest that the effectiveness of EC measures 
envisaged under the EC Treaty should be assessed in abstracto in order to 
ascertain whether such incompatibility arises. Instead, it is the speciﬁc nature 
of the restrictive measures which the Council may be called upon to adopt 
under the speciﬁc EC Treaty legal bases, namely Articles 57(2) EC, 59 EC and 
60(1) EC. Therefore, a temptation to interpret the rulings in the BITs cases in 
broad terms should be resisted. It is interesting that, in her Opinion in the case 
of the Finish BITs, Advocate General Sharpston also relies upon the directive 
34. Para 37 of his Opinion. 
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parallel, albeit from the effectiveness point of view, arguing that in the two 
judgments under review the Court “has effectively required a guarantee that 
restrictions to capital movements and to payments, as provided for in Articles 
57(2), 59 and 60(1) EC, could if necessary be applied”.35 Viewed from this 
angle, the parallel with the directives becomes more helpful.
 A counterargument to the Court’s approach may draw upon the position of 
a Member State which, as a matter of fact, ﬁnds itself torn between its obliga-
tion to comply with EC measures adopted under 57(2) EC, 59 EC and 60(1) 
EC and its duty to respect the international law commitment which it has 
assumed pursuant to a bilateral treaty; it may choose to honour the former and 
violate the latter. And this choice raises no issues which the Court of Justice 
would have jurisdiction to review. However, this possibility, and any commit-
ment to that effect which a Member State may make, however ﬁrm it is, would 
not disguise the fact that, in principle, the option of violating Community law 
would also be open. This state of uncertainty may not be tolerated under EC 
law. On the one hand, a similar argument made by the Portuguese Government 
in the two cases about cargo-sharing clauses in maritime agreements in the late 
1990s had been ignored by the Court.36 On the other hand, it has been a con-
stant theme in the Court’s internal market case law under Article 226 EC that 
“an ambiguous state of affairs” and “a state of uncertainty” resulting from the 
maintenance, but non-application, of national law contrary to EC law can not 
be tolerated.37 And although this line of reasoning was put forward in order to 
protect the individual by ensuring that there would be no doubt as to the exis-
tence of his/her Community law rights, it may also be extended to ensure the 
effectiveness of measures which the Community may be called upon to take in 
exceptional circumstances.
6.3. The alternatives tolerated under Article 307 EC, but not by  the 
Court …   
What is rather curious is the cursory approach by the Court and Advocate 
General Maduro to public international law. In his Opinion, he dealt with the 
35. See the Opinion in Commission v. Finland, cited supra note 4, para 32 (emphasis in the 
original). 
36. Case C-62/98, Commission v. Portugal, cited supra note 12, at para 13 and C-84/98, 
Commission v. Portugal, cited supra note 12, at para 13.  
37. Case 167/73, Commission v. France, [1974] ECR 359, Case 74/86, Commission v. 
 Germany, [1988] ECR 2139, para 10, Case C-358/98, Commission v. Italy, [2000] ECR I-1255, 
paras. 16 and 17, Case C-160/99, Commission v. France, [2000] ECR I-6137, para 22, Case 
C-487/04, Commission v. Italy, [2006] ECR I-85*, para 33, Case C-522/04, Commission v. 
 Belgium, [2007] ECR I-5701, para 70, Case C-214/04, Commission v. Italy, judgment of 7 July 
2005, unpublished, para 13. 
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argument put forward by the Swedish and Austrian Governments about the 
principle clausula rebus sic stantibus: under Article 62 of the Vienna Con-
vention, a party to an international government may terminate or withdraw 
from an agreement following a fundamental change of circumstances provided 
that, on the one hand, the existence of those circumstances constituted an 
essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty, and, on 
the other hand, the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of 
obligations still to be performed under the treaty. Advocate General Maduro 
dismissed this argument merely by stating that the application of this principle 
“constitutes a controversial point of international law”.38 To support his con-
clusion, he, as well as Advocate General Sharpston in her Opinion in the Finish 
BITs case, relies upon the ruling in Case 812/79, Burgoa where the Court had 
held that “Article [307] EC is of general scope and it applies to any interna-
tional agreement … which is capable of affecting the application of a Treaty”.39
 However, this statement merely suggested that the subject-matter of the pre-
accession agreement need not coincide with the competence of the Commu-
nity, as it is only compatibility with EC law which is of relevance;40 it did not 
refer to the role of international law principles in rendering pre-accession 
agreements compatible with EC law, neither did it set any degree of certainty 
which such principles should be expected to meet. 
 In this vein, it is regrettable that the Court should choose to ignore the alter-
natives which its own case law had suggested. In Budvar, a judgment rendered 
in 2003, the Court of Justice had held that “the national court must ascertain 
whether a possible incompatibility between the Treaty and the bilateral con-
vention can be avoided by interpreting that convention, to the extent possible 
and in compliance with international law, in such a way that it is consistent 
with Community law”.41 It had, then, added that “[i]f it proves impracticable to 
interpret an agreement concluded prior to a Member State’s accession to the 
European Union in such a way that it is consistent with Community law then, 
within the framework of Article 307 EC, it is open to that State to take the 
38. Para 62 of his Opinion. He also states that the principle “is applied in very limited 
 circumstances, and whether it can be applied to the present cases is a matter of controversy” 
(para 61). 
39. Attorney General v. Burgoa, cited supra note 7, para 6. See A.G. Sharpston in supra 
note 4, para 27. 
40. See Cremona, “Defending the Community Interest: The Duties of Cooperation and 
 Compliance” in Cremona and De Witte (Eds.), EU Foreign Relations (Hart Publishing, 2008), 
p. 125, at p. 132.  
41. Budvar cited supra note 29, para 169. On the substantive point of law raised in this case, 
see Case C-478/07, Budĕjovický Budvar, národní podnik v. Rudolf Ammersin GmbH, judgment 
of 8 Sept. 2009, nyr.  
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appropriate steps, while, however, remaining obliged to eliminate any incom-
patibilities existing between the earlier agreement and the Treaty”.42 
 This duty of interpretation and the role of national courts which its applica-
tion entails introduces a considerable variant in the application of Article of 
307 EC: not only does it broaden the scope of possibilities open to the Mem-
ber States in their effort to tackle incompatibilities between their prior agree-
ments and EC law, but it also carves out a contribution for national courts in 
this process.43 This parameter is completely ignored by the Court, whereas the 
Advocate General dismissed it by merely stating that “the obligation imposed 
by Article 307 EC on Member States to take all appropriate steps to eliminate 
[an incompatibility between a prior agreement and EC law] would serve no 
purpose”.44
  This cursory approach is regrettable. It is true that the legal and procedural 
context in Budvar and the BITs rulings differ: the contribution of national 
courts and the possibility of consistent interpretation were introduced in the 
former in the context of a preliminary reference, where national courts are the 
Court’s interlocutors; the latter judgments were rendered in the context of 
direct enforcement procedures. However, this distinction does not make the 
possibility of consistent interpretation de facto irrelevant, neither does it jus-
tify the Court’s silence and the Advocate General’s cursory approach.
 There is a broader issue which the above approach of the Court raises, 
namely the legal context required for a Member State to become aware of an 
incompatibility between an international agreement concluded prior to its 
accession to the Union and EU law. In an earlier case, Case C-203/03, Com-
mission v. Luxembourg,45 the Court was asked to deal with Austrian legislation 
on the employment of women in the underground mining industry, which, 
whilst consistent with Convention No. 45 of the International Labour Organi-
zation ratiﬁed by Austria in 1937, was alleged by the Commission to run coun-
ter to the principle of equal treatment for men and women as set out in Directive 
76/207.46 In a judgment delivered by the Grand Chamber almost four years 
prior to the BITs rulings, the Court conﬁrmed the incompatibility pursuant to 
Article 307 EC. However, it held that, at the only time prior to its ruling when, 
according to the Convention’s rules, Austria could have denounced the Con-
vention, “the incompatibility of the prohibition laid down by that convention 
42. Ibid., para 170. 
43. See the analysis in Koutrakos, op. cit. supra note 6, at pp. 309-313.  
44. Para 57 of his Opinion. 
45. Case C-203/03, Commission v. Luxembourg, [2005] ECR I-935. 
46. Arts. 2(1) and 3(1), O.J. 1976, L 39/40. 
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with the provisions of Directive 76/207 had not been sufﬁciently clearly estab-
lished for that Member State to be bound to denounce the convention”.47 
 Whilst criticized on its application to the facts of that case,48 the above con-
clusion appears to suggest a link between the clarity of the state of Community 
law and the intensity of the obligation imposed on Member States to address 
the incompatibilities to which Article 307(2) EC. This clarity is deﬁned to a 
considerable extent by the case law of the Court of Justice. Viewed from this 
angle, the approach adopted in the BITs judgments is regrettable. This is not to 
suggest that judgments should carry out the function of academic analyses and 
provide exhaustive arguments for all theoretical issues pertaining to a case 
brought before them; on the contrary, judgments are rendered in speciﬁc con-
texts within which Europe’s judges are asked to adjudicate on a speciﬁc dis-
pute. However, it is in the interest of the Community that the Member States 
should be aware of both the circumstances in which their pre-accession inter-
national obligations may become incompatible with EC law and the options 
which Article 307 EC sets out for them in order to remedy such incompatibil-
ities.
6.4. The role of the Commission 
It is recalled that, having concluded that Austrian and Sweden had violated 
Article 307 EC by not having denounced their BITs, the Court referred to the 
Commission and its general role under Article 211 EC to facilitate mutual 
assistance between the Member States seeking to eliminate an incompatibility 
under Article 307 EC as well as the adoption of a common attitude.49 This is 
noteworthy for a number of reasons. First, it is interesting that the Court should 
have chosen to construe the role of the Commission with reference to Article 
211 EC, rather than Article 307 EC itself. After all, its contribution in the 
achievement of the objectives of the latter provision had already been seen as 
implied: it is recalled that in Burgoa the Court had pointed out that Article 
307(1) EC “would not achieve its purpose if it did not imply a duty on the part 
of the institutions of the Community not to impede the performance of the 
obligations of Member States which stem from a prior agreement”.50
 Second, whilst the Court imposes a speciﬁc duty on the Commission in the 
context of Article 307 EC, it does not follow that this is linked to the fulﬁlment 
of the obligation of the Member State to eliminate an incompatibility with EC 
47. Commission v. Luxembourg, cited supra note 45, para 62.
48. Koutrakos, op. cit. supra note 6, at pp. 315-6.  
49. Para 44 of the judgments. 
50. Attorney General v. Juan C Burgoa, cited supra note 7, para 9.  
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law. Put differently, the failure of the Commission to discharge of its role could 
not justify a failure by a Member State to comply with its duty as set out in 
Article 307(2) EC. In this vein, the Court held in International Maritime Orga-
nization that the failure by the Commission to comply with its Article 10 EC 
duty of cooperation in the context of EC external relations does not entitle a 
Member State to violate its own obligations as set out in the EC Treaty.51
 Third, the reference in the BITs judgments to the role of the Commission is 
as general as it can be. It reminds one of the way the Court referred to the duty 
of loyal cooperation in the context of mixed agreements in the 1990s: seeking 
to rebuff the Commission’s persistent claims to exclusivity by reference to 
practical difﬁculties which the participation of Member States along with the 
Community would raise, the Court set out this duty at the end of its rulings, 
and merely pointed out that it applies both to the Community institutions and 
the Member States in the process of the negotiation, conclusion and applica-
tion of mixed agreements.52 In the BITs judgments, the reference to the role of 
the Commission is made following the conclusion that the incompatibility 
between BITs and Articles 57(2) EC, 59 EC and 60(1) EC is an issue of con-
cern to more than one Member State. This suggests an emphasis on a concerted 
approach, which is noteworthy in the light of the more recent practice, as there 
has been a steady effort on behalf of the EU to iron out incompatibilities 
between obligations assumed by Member States pursuant to bilateral agree-
ments and EC law.
 For the purposes of this analysis, sufﬁce it to point out two strands. On the 
one hand, the 2004 and 2007 enlargements were preceded by a process aiming 
to set out the duties of the new Member States in relation to the pre-accession 
international obligations. This is illustrated by the Accession Treaties, the pro-
visions of which on the accession of the new Member States to international 
conventions are considerably more detailed in comparison to previous Acces-
sion Treaties.53 On the other hand, in relation to investment treaties in particu-
lar, the Commission had engaged in an innovative exercise of mediation 
between eight candidate, as they then were, countries54 and the United States 
in order to adjust bilateral agreements concluded between them. The aim of 
51. Case C-45/07, Commission v. Greece, judgment of 12 Feb. 2009, nyr, paras. 25-6.  
52. See Opinion 2/91, [1993] ECR I-1061, paras. 36-8, and Opinion 1/94, [1994] ECR 
I-5267, paras. 107-109. That obligation was construed in more speciﬁc terms in judgments such 
as Case C-25/94, Commission v. Council (Food and Agricultural Organisation), [1996] ECR 
I-1469, Commission v. Luxembourg, cited supra note 1; Commission v. Ireland (re: Mox Plant), 
cited supra note 2. 
53. See Art. 6 of the 2003 Act of Accession, O.J. 2003, L 236/33, and Art. 6 of the 2005 
 Protocol concerning the conditions and arrangements for admission of the Republic of Bulgaria 
and Romania to the European Union – O.J. 2005, L 157/29.  
54. Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania.
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this process was to prevent incompatibilities between these BITs and EC law 
prior to accession. Whilst the formal effects of this process, set out in a Mem-
orandum of Understanding signed on 22 September 2003 in Brussels by the 
Commission, the eight countries, and the United States, may be debated,55 the 
initiative itself, undertaken by the Commission, suggests an increasing inten-
sity in the Union’s effort to minimize the deleterious effects that the pre-exist-
ing international obligations of the Member States may have on the application 
of the acquis communautaire.
 Viewed in the light of the above, the reference in the BITs judgment to the 
role of the Commission in a case where more than one Member States must 
tackle the same incompatibility appears to suggest a thread which brings 
together different strands of the theory and practice of Article 307 EC. By 
articulating a normative foundation of the Commission’s involvement in the 
application of Article 307 (2) EC, the Court appears to open up the personal 
scope of that provision and focus on the management of its implications. Quite 
what the role of the Commission may entail in this respect remains to be seen. 
It is interesting, however, that in other areas of external relations it has led to 
the articulation of a sophisticated and pragmatic framework aiming to ensure 
coordination and compliance with Community law. This was the case of Reg-
ulation 847/2007/EC on the negotiation and implementation of air service 
agreements between Member States and third countries.56 Based on Article 
80(2) EC, this measure establishes a system of cooperation between the Com-
mission and Member States aiming at the coordination of negotiations with 
third countries, the achievement of a harmonized approach in the implementa-
tion and application of air services agreements, and the veriﬁcation of their 
compliance with Community law. It does so by setting out a framework of 
interaction between the Commission and the Member State negotiating an air 
services agreement and imposing substantive and procedural duties. This prag-
matic approach has inspired recent proposals in other contexts of EU external 
relations and involving different degrees of intensity of obligations.57
55. See Burgstaller, “European Law and Investment Treaties”, 26 Journal of International 
Arbitration (2009), 181, at 201-203, and Koutrakos, op. cit. supra note 6, at pp. 322-326.  
56. O.J. 2004, L 157/7.
57. See COM(2008)893 ﬁnal, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council establishing a procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of bilateral agreements 
between Member States and third countries concerning sectoral matters and covering applicable 
law in contractual and non-contractual obligations (Brussels, 23 Dec. 2008), and COM(2008)894 
ﬁnal, Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a procedure for the negotiation and conclu-
sion of bilateral agreements between Member States and third countries concerning sectoral 
matters and covering jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments and decisions in 
matrimonial matters, parental responsibility and maintenance obligations, and applicable law in 
matters relating to maintenance obligations (Brussels, 19 Dec. 2008). 
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7. Conclusion 
This analysis suggested that the BITs judgments should be viewed as a justiﬁed 
application of Article 307 EC in the light of the very speciﬁc features of the 
measures which the Community may be called upon to take pursuant to 
Articles 59 and 60(1) EC (but not necessarily Art. 57(2) EC). Conﬁned to the 
context of these speciﬁc exceptional provisions, the judgments do not lend 
themselves to wider propositions about the duties which Article 307(2) EC 
imposes on Member States.
 It also argued that the Court correctly viewed the issue of the incompatibil-
ity between the pre-accession BITs and EC law as one related to the duties 
imposed on Member States following their accession to the Union, rather than 
of competence.58 However, the implications of the judgments are considerable 
for both the Member States and the Commission. In relation to the former, one 
should point out the considerable number of BITs which they have concluded.59 
As for the latter, the reference in the judgments to its role under Article 211 EC 
brings the Commission to the centre of the management of the application of 
Article 307 EC. 
 Viewed together, the above suggest that the Court responds to the increas-
ing effort of the EU institutions to address problems between pre-accession 
international obligations and EC law, to which it adds a normative dimension 
in order to ensure a concerted approach. Therefore, a growing engagement of 
the EU with the Member States in order to enforce the ratio of Article 307 EC 
appears to emerge.   
Panos Koutrakos*
58. For the relationship between BITs generally and EU law, see Eilmansberger, “Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and EU Law”, 46 CML Rev. (2009), 383.
59. According to Radu, Germany, UK, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxem-
bourg have concluded more than 500 BITs: Radu, “Foreign investors in the EU – Which ‘Best 
Treatment’? Interactions between bilateral investment treaties and EU law”, 14 ELJ (2008), 237, 
at 238.
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